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Executive Summary 
 
Terms of Reference 
 
The Economics Reference Committee of the Senate Standing Committee on 
Economics of the Australian Parliament has been asked to investigate the 2016 
Census, with particular reference to 
 
* the preparation, administration and management on the part of the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Government in the lead up to the 2016 Census; 
* the scope, collection, retention, security and use of data obtained in the 2016 
Census; 
* arrangements, including contractual arrangements, in respect of the 
information technology aspects of the Census; 
* the shutting down of the Census website on the evening of 9 August 2016, the 
factors leading to that shutdown and the reasons given, and the support provided by 
government agencies, including the Australian Signals Directorate; 
* the response rate to the Census and factors that may have affected the response 
rate; 
* privacy concerns in respect of the 2016 Census, including the use of data 
linking, information security and statistical linkage keys; 
* Australia’s Census of Population and Housing generally, including purpose, 
scope, regularity and cost and benefits; 
* the adequacy of funding and resources to the ABS; 
* ministerial oversight and responsibility; and 
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* any related matters. 
 
This joint submission has its origins in our research, public policy work, and 
community engagement at the Queensland University of Technology around the 
Census 2016.1 We provided expert commentary in the media during the controversy.2 
The topic is of interest to both intellectual property and media law, and criminal law 
																																																								
1  Niki Widdowson, ‘Fright Night: Australia’s Creepy Census Threatens Privacy and Our Civil 
Liberties’, QUT News, 9 August 2016, https://www.qut.edu.au/news/news?news-id=108161  
2  Glen Bartholomew, ‘Debate Continues Over Privacy Concerns Surrounding the 2016 Census’, 
ABC News Radio, 9 August 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/newsradio/content/s4515482.htm Natasha 
Bita, ‘Cyber Hack Proves Flaws: Census Fail’, Daily Telegraph, 13 August 2016, 36; Marie 
McInerney, ‘Australia’s “Creepy Census” Threatens Privacy and Our Civil Liberties’, Croakey, 12 
August 2016, https://croakey.org/australias-creepy-census-threatens-privacy-and-our-civil-liberties/; 
Kevin Rennie, ‘Australia’s Census Website Was Never Very Popular, And That Was Before Cyber 
Attacks Crashed It’, Global Voices, 11 August 2016, https://globalvoices.org/2016/08/11/australias-
census-website-was-never-very-popular-and-that-was-before-cyber-attacks-crashed-it/ ‘They Said It’, 
Daily Telegraph, 11 August 2016, 54; Spandas Lui, ‘Census 2016 Website Crash: DDoS Attack, 
Incompetence of Something More Sinister?’ Life Hacker, 10 August 2016 
http://www.lifehacker.com.au/2016/08/census-2016-fail-ddos-attack-or-something-else/; Rod Chester, 
‘Census Fail: ABS Says Hackers Attacked Website Despite Denials, After Nearly $500,00 was Spent 
on Load Testing Servers’, The Daily Telegraph, 9 August 2016, 10 August 2016, 
http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/technology/census-fail-abs-spent-nearly-500000-on-load-testing-
the-servers/news-
story/d04709eca6e02d1bbc492a0be9dffa58?nk=203daef6e1042d0a754e912bf9e6fa71-1470889304 
Published also as ‘Census Fail Raises More Questions’ and ‘Census Hack: ABS Targeted Four Times’. 
Rohan Pearce, ‘Backlash Against Census Continues’, Computer World, 9 August 2016, 
http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/604815/backlash-against-census-continues/ 
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and justice. This joint submission by two legal researchers makes the following 
recommendations to the inquiry into Census 2016: 
 
Recommendations 
 
 
Recommendation 1 
In the United States of America and the European Union, there has been a 
history of misuse and abuse of Census data. Such history highlights the 
need for appropriate protection of individual anonymity, confidentiality, 
privacy, security, and secrecy. 
 
 
Recommendation 2 
The preparation, administration and management on the part of the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Government in the lead up 
to the 2016 Census was inadequate. The privacy assessment was cursory 
and lacked independence and impartiality. There was a lack of genuine 
consultation with the public, civil society, privacy experts, and 
information security specialists about the 2016 Census Model. 
 
 
Recommendation 3 
The Australian Bureau Of Statistics has taken an overly broad approach 
to the collection, retention, and use of data obtained in the 2016 Census. 
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Recommendation 4 
Names and addresses (and other data at a personally identifiable level) 
should not be collected in the Census, and any data of this nature collected 
be destroyed. 
 
Recommendation 5 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics should not create Statistical Linkage 
Keys (SLKs). 
 
Recommendation 6 
That previous or future Australian Bureau of Statistics data breaches are 
disclosed and subject to formal inquiry. 
 
 
Recommendation 7 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics should stripped of the power to make 
threats and issue fines in light of the importance of voluntary 
participation, informed consent, and research ethics. 
 
 
Recommendation 8 
There is a need to overhaul contractual arrangements in respect of the 
information technology aspects of the Census. 
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Recommendation 9 
That oversight and accountability processes be strengthened, either 
through a more active role of the Office of Australian Information 
Commissioner (OAIC); or the completion of an independent and 
transparent Privacy Impact Assessment. 
 
 
Recommendation 10 
Caution must be exercised in the interpretation and use of the 2016 census 
data due to the issues that arose during its administration, and the 
subsequently lower than usual response rate.  
 
 
Recommendation 11 
The Federal Parliament should implement the recommendations of the 
Australian Law Reform Commission in respect of the introduction of a 
statutory cause of action for serious invasions of privacy. 
 
Recommendation 12 
It is worthwhile comparing the experience of the 2016 Census in Australia 
with the 2016 Census in Canada. While Canada enjoyed a high 
completion rate of its census, Statistics Canada did experience significant 
problems in respect of information technology. Moreover, there have been 
conflicting legal precedents in Canada about the imposition of fines for 
non-completion of the mandatory census. 
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Introduction 
 
This submission provides a critical legal analysis of the Census 2016. This work relies 
upon historical context; an analysis of the legal associated with anonymity, 
confidentiality, privacy, and information security; a consideration of research ethics; 
and comparative analysis, looking at jurisdictions of North America and the European 
Union. This submission has three main parts. First, there is a general discussion of the 
history of the Census, and the concerns that have arisen over the misuse of 
information, particularly in the United States and the European Union. Second, there 
is an analysis of the evolution and development of the 2016 Census in Australia. 
There is an in-depth analysis of legal, ethical, and public policy issues arising from 
the 2016 Census. Third, this submission counterpoints the Australian experience with 
Canada’s Census 2016. 
 
1. The History of the Census 
 
In his 1939 poem, ‘The Unknown Citizen’, the poet W.H. Auden reflects upon the 
relationship between the citizen and the state, thinking about the work of the Bureau 
of Statistics: 
 
He was found by the Bureau of Statistics to be 
One against whom there was no official complaint, 
And all the reports on his conduct agree 
That, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, he was a 
   saint, 
For in everything he did he served the Greater Community… 
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Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd: 
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard.3 
 
In many ways, this is a prescient and resonant piece of work by W.H. Auden about 
information collecting by governments and states. It is also about the limits of 
government knowledge, and personal identity, privacy, and confidentiality.  
 
For Rear Vision, Annabelle Quince and Keri Phillips of ABC Radio National 
considered the historical debate over the Census. 4  Historian Professor Margo 
Anderson from the University of Wisconsin provides a useful overview of the 
development of the modern census: 
 
Censuses are formal time-defined population counts of a national state, and most countries do 
them now and most have for a good chunk of the 20th century. The function of the census is 
variable for different countries. In the US for example it's used to allocate seats in our 
legislatures and in particular our House of Representatives and in our electoral college. It's 
used as the baseline measure almost in all countries for economic statistics. So many of us are 
familiar with things like the labour force participation rate or the unemployment rate and so 
forth. And you need…for those rates you need denominators. And the census often serves as 
the baseline information for that. It's used for measuring growth and change and migration 
around the country. And often there are kind of cultural reasons that people, they mark the 
progress of their societies, if you will, by periodic census.5 
 
																																																								
3  W.H. Auden, Another Time, New York: Random House, 1939. 
4  Annabelle Quince and Keri Phillips, ‘The Dark Side of the Census’, ABC, Rear Vision, 18 
September 2016 http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/the-misuse-of-census-
data/7785358  
5  Ibid. 
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Taking a long view, Margo Anderson comments that there has been an evolution in 
the role and purpose of the modern census: ‘So I would argue that in the late 18th, 
early 19th century there was a fundamental shift in the notion of what a census was 
for, shifting it to the ruler looking at his ruled, to the people essentially standing up 
and expressing themselves.’6 
 
A. The United States of America 
 
There is a significant dark history of abuse and misuse of census information by 
national governments. Margo Anderson reflected upon how the census was used in 
the United States during World War I: 
 
In the United States during World War I the census was used to identify draft-dodgers. The 
selective service system, in other words the administration that was supposed to handle the 
draft, went to the census bureau and said we think people are lying about their ages. In other 
words, they were either saying they were too young or too old to be eligible for the draft. So 
give us the information from the 1910 census to tell us how old they are so we can draft.7 
 
She noted: ‘The census officials were quite uncomfortable with it, and essentially they 
basically strengthened the protections against that kind of intrusion after the First 
World War.’8 The historian also observed: ‘During the 1920s in the US the Justice 
Department and the Labour Department went and asked for the ages of children in the 
1920 census because they wanted to prosecute employers who were violating child 
																																																								
6  Ibid. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Ibid. 
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labour laws’.9 She noted that there was ‘a similar kind of question; do you give out 
that information to facilitate that prosecution?’10 
 
There have been a number of subsequent controversies in the United States. In the 
wake of the Pearl Harbour attack during World War II, Margo Anderson comments 
that census data was used for the purposes of the internment of members of the 
American-Japanese community: 
 
There was a racialist and racist reaction to the relatively small Japanese community on the 
West Coast that led to the congressional delegations and the governors and the media, the 
press, to call for the ousting of all Japanese from the West Coast, and their physical removal 
out of military areas. And in February '42 Franklin Roosevelt in an executive order authorised 
that removal, and from late February, early March of 1942, so July '42 the Japanese-American 
population on the west coast of the US was rounded up and sent to concentration camps for 
the duration of the war. The census, what they call small area data, was used to identify again 
the neighbourhoods and the city blocks and the communities where the Japanese-Americans 
lived.11 
 
She commented that ‘Congress also debated it and Congress passed a law in 
February/March of 1942 eliminating the protection of statistical confidentiality on the 
census.’12 She noted: ‘Years later the government apologised and paid reparations to 
																																																								
9  Ibid. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Ibid. 
12  Ibid. 
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the survivors and the people who had been incarcerated during the war, but that was 
not the sensibility during the war itself.’13 
 
There is a rich body of jurisprudence over the United States census. In the 1982 case 
of Baldrige v. Shapiro, the Supreme Court of the United States highlights the 
importance of census confidentiality: 
 
The foregoing history of the Census Act reveals a congressional intent to protect the 
confidentiality of census information by prohibiting disclosure of raw census data reported by 
or on behalf of individuals. Subsequent congressional action is consistent with this 
interpretation. In response to claimed undercounts in the census of 1960 and of 1970, 
Congress considered, but ultimately rejected, proposals to allow local officials limited access 
to census data in order to challenge the census count.14 
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized: ‘We hold that, 
whether sought by way of requests under the FOIA or by way of discovery rules, raw 
data reported by or on behalf of individuals need not be disclosed.’15 
 
After the events of 9/11 there was an attempt to access census data in America.16 Marc 
Rotenberg from the Electronic Privacy Information Center recalls: 
 
																																																								
13  Ibid. 
14  Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345 (1982). 
15  Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345 (1982). 
16  Annabelle Quince and Keri Phillips, ‘The Dark Side of the Census’, ABC, Rear Vision, 18 
September 2016 http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/the-misuse-of-census-
data/7785358 
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After 9/11 when the US had been attacked and the Department of Homeland Security went to 
the census bureau and said to the census bureau please give us information, in fact the data of 
the location of Muslim Americans living in the United States. And again you could sense very 
similar to what happened during the Second World War, the beginning of an effort to identify 
Muslim Americans. I don't think there was ever internment discussed, but at least some type 
of special measures. And we learned of this through a Freedom of Information Act that we 
had pursued with the Department of Homeland Security at the time.17 
 
Rotenberg stressed: ‘The good news is that when the program was revealed, there was 
a genuine effort within the census department to improve its confidentiality 
procedures and to make clear that the information being collected by that one agency 
should not be made available to other federal agencies, even in those kinds of 
circumstances.’18 
 
B. The European Union 
 
Edwin Black, the author of IBM and the Holocaust,19 discussed how Nazi Germany 
employed IBM to conduct a census: 
 
IBM, which bills itself as the solutions company, came to Nazi Germany and said we have the 
solution. They came up with the racial census. So first of all IBM in and of itself, by itself, 
hired thousands and thousands of census takers, they went door to door, they did this for the 
government. All the information was all brought into one warehouse in Berlin, centralised. 
Day and night these paper forms were punched into special IBM coding machines. And then 
																																																								
17  Ibid. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Edward Black, IBM and the Holocaust, Crown Books, 2001. 
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in one column they would have your mother tongue, whether it was Polish or German or 
Ukrainian. 
 In a second column they would have your religion, whether it was Jewish or 
Lutheran or Islam or a Catholic. In another column they would have your nationality; were 
you from Germany, were you from Poland, were you from France? In yet another column they 
would have your profession; were you a banker, were you a professor, were you a doctor? 
And then in a final column they would have your city, whether you were in Berlin or whether 
you were in Munich. And then at the rate of 24,000 cards per hour [snaps fingers], like that, 
suddenly they knew the identification and location of all the Jews in Berlin who were doctors. 
That was IBM. 20 
 
Edward Black commented that the Census played a significant role across the six 
phases of the Holocaust. Margo Anderson added: ‘What the Nazis did is that they 
took the information, the population information from the countries that they invaded, 
and used it to identify people to be rounded up and put in labour camps and ultimately 
exterminated.’ 21  She was also conscious of the exploitation of government data 
systems in countries occupied by Nazi Germany: ‘So in Norway, in the Netherlands, 
in France, once the Nazis took over the governments, they got into the data systems 
and used them essentially to control the population.’22 
 
As a result of this history, there have been protests over the privacy implications of 
census-taking in the European Union. In West Germany in 1987, the German 
																																																								
20  Annabelle Quince and Keri Phillips, ‘The Dark Side of the Census’, ABC, Rear Vision, 18 
September 2016 http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/the-misuse-of-census-
data/7785358  
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid. 
15 
 
Germans led a boycott against the Census, arguing that it would unduly violate 
privacy laws.23 
 
At a more systematic level, there has been a strong tradition of protection of 
anonymity, confidentiality, privacy, and human rights in the European Union.24 There 
has been extensive litigation over privacy in the European Union.25 There have also 
been significant litigation in respect of privacy in the United Kingdom. 26  The 
controversy over phone hacking by media organisations has also raised concerns 
about privacy and confidentiality.27  There has also been the development of new 
doctrines in the European Union, such as the right to be forgotten.28 
																																																								
23  ‘Greens lead Boycott against Census’,  The Canberra Times, 11 March 1987, 
http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/136294365  
24  European Convention on Human Rights. 
25  Von Hannover v. Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 
26  Hellewell v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804 
A v. B and C [2002] 3 WLR 542; Wainwright v. Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 (16 October 2003); 
Douglas and Zeta Jones v. Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967; [2003] 3 All ER 996; [2006] 1 QB 967; [2007] 
UKHL 21; Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers [2004] 2 All ER 995; HRH The Prince of Wales v. 
Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 522 (Ch); Murray v. Express Newspapers PLC [2007] 
EWHC 1908; on appeal Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446; Mosley v News 
Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) (24 July 2008); and John Terry v. News Group 
Newspapers Ltd [2010] EWHC 119 (QB). 
27  Tom Watson and Martin Hickman, Dial M for Murdoch: News Corporation and the 
Corruption of Britain, Blue Rider Press, 2012; Nick Davies, Hack Attack: The Inside Story of How the 
Truth Caught up with Rupert Murdoch, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014; and Jon Ronson, So You’ve 
Been Publicly Shamed, Riverhead Books and Pan Macmillan, 2015. 
28  Meg Leta Jones, Crtl + Z: The Right to Be Forgotten, New York: New York University Press, 
2016. 
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2. The Australian Debate over the Census 
 
 
 
While there has been much controversy over the Census in 2016, it would be wrong 
to assume that this is an isolated incident or occurrence. There have been 
longstanding legal, ethical, and public policy issues with the Australian Census. 
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Historian Ben Wilkie points to early historical debates in Australia over the census 
and the privacy of personal information.29 
 
Notably, in 1969, Senator Lionel Murphy expressed concerns about the expansion of 
census requirements.30 He argued that the Australian Labor Party would press strongly 
for a Bill of Rights to provide for better protection of civil liberties and privacy. It is 
striking that Senator Lionel Murphy makes a much stronger case for the protection for 
privacy, civil liberties, and human rights in 1969 than some of his contemporary 
successors in the Australian Labor Party in 2016. 
 
In 1971, Liberal Treasurer, Billy Snedden, mandated the destruction of names and 
addresses in census forms in response to privacy concerns. 31  
 
In 1976 and again in 1979, Michael Kirby – eminent law reformer and jurist – flagged 
issues with privacy, consent, and compulsion with the Australian Census.32 In 1979 
																																																								
29  'The Census: Privacy of Information', The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 December 1932. 
30  ‘Privacy Invaded: MP Attacks New Census Paper’, The Canberra Times, 18 July 1969,  
https://t.co/ZP4EDtaqaj  
31  Michael Piggott, Archives and Societal Provenance: Australian Essays, Elsevier, 2012, 141, 
https://books.google.com.au/books?id=CGZEAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA141&lpg=PA141&dq=snedden+ce
nsus+1971&source=bl&ots=ysbUBzsnaZ&sig=wLiVJE1PIudmopL3HXJqpZqySVY&hl=en&sa=X&
ved=0ahUKEwjx-
dOcq53PAhWDOz4KHRjfAWsQ6AEIVDAJ#v=onepage&q=snedden%20census%201971&f=false  
32  'Judge sees census as intrusion of privacy', The Canberra Times, 23 April 1976 
http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/110814299 The Hon. Michael Kirby,  ‘Privacy Protection, 
Economic Protectionism’, the Australian Law Reform Commission, March 1979,  3, 
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the Australian Law Reform Commission recommended that census forms be retained. 
Treasurer, Hon John Howard MP rejected this recommendation.33 He decided not to 
accept the recommendation that the Census raw data be kept: ‘The government 
believes that it would ld be inconsistent with [the gathering of statistical information] 
and ... the guarantee of confidentiality to retain information on identified persons or 
households for research purposes.’ 34  He commented: ‘Consequently the present 
practice of destroying all records of names and addresses and of not entering into the 
computer record such names and addresses will be continued’. 35  Successive 
governments have maintained the practice of form destruction. 
 
Democrat Senator Natasha Stott Despoja repeatedly raised concerns about the 
punitive use of threats and fines by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.36 She recalls 
that her mother was a successful objector to a survey by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics:  
 
At the time my mother was summonsed, the surveys contained sensitive questions about 
health: matters like incontinence, smoker's cough and other things. She was even threatened 
with a fine for refusing to have an "opinion" about smokers. My mother won her case. The 
																																																																																																																																																														
http://www.michaelkirby.com.au/images/stories/speeches/1970s/vol4/1979/95-
Remote_Access_Information_Developments_-_Privacy_Protection,_Economic_Protectionism.pdf  
33  Australian Law Reform Commission, Reform, 1980, 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ALRCRefJl/1980/6.pdf  
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Natasha Stott Despoja, ‘ABS Survey: An Offer You Can’t Refuse’, The Advertiser, 20 
October 2008, http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/archive/news/abs-survey-an-offer-you-cant-
refuse/story-e6fread3-1111117804149?nk=203daef6e1042d0a754e912bf9e6fa71-1474436583  
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story of her prosecution (some might say persecution) was chronicled over months in her 
newspaper column, Saturday Serve, right up to the courtroom and the judgment in her favour. 
 
Natasha Stott Despoja has been concerned about the use of threats and fines against 
other Australian citizens. She noted the case of the Van den Berg family: ‘Despite 
their age (they're in their 80s), non-working status and poor health, they were also 
being threatened with the daily fine of $110 for not agreeing to participate in the 
survey.’ 37  Natasha Stott Despoja emphasized: ‘I do not accept that statistical 
compilation in the form of monthly surveys requires threats and compulsion.’38 She 
stresses: ‘I doubt the validity of information acquired under such heavy 
compulsion.’39 Natasha Stott Despoja noted: ‘I understand the nature of statistics and I 
acknowledge the need for random selection but I also know you can randomly select 
additional willing participants without having to threaten or penalise citizens opposed 
to and/or upset by the survey process.’40 She observed that National Party senator 
Glen Sheil introduced a private member's Bill to make the surveys non-compulsory, 
but it was unsuccessful. Natasha Stott Despoja was concerned about the unchecked 
expansion of power by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, noting ‘the ABS has 
increased its power over the years.’41 
 
																																																								
37  Ibid. 
38  Ibid. 
39  Ibid. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Ibid. 
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a.  the preparation, administration and management on the part of the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Government in the lead up to the 
2016 Census; 
 
There were significant problems with the preparation, administration and 
management on the part of the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the Government in 
the lead up to the 2016 Census. The Australian Bureau of Statistics rushed through a 
risible “low risk” privacy impact assessment before Christmas 2015, without  
adequate consultation with the public or civil society. The Australian Bureau of 
Statistics presented its policy change as a ‘fait accompli’.42 
 
In February 2016, the Australian Privacy Foundation responded, writing a letter to the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, expressing its deep concern about the process and the 
substance behind the Census 2016.43 The Australian Privacy Foundation observed: 
‘Contrary to best practice, the PIA was conducted in-house, not by an independent 
third party’.44 The Australian Privacy Foundation noted: ‘ While the ABS claims that 
it directly notified key stakeholders of the PIA process, to our knowledge, no NGOs, 
human rights or civil society organisations were notified or consulted.’ 45  The 
																																																								
42  Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Retention of names and addresses collected in the 2016 
Census of Population and Housing’, 18 December 2015, 
http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/D3310114.nsf/home/Retention+of+names+and+addresses+collecte
d  
43  Australian Privacy Foundation, ‘Australian Census and Privacy Impact Assessment’, 12 
February 2016, https://www.privacy.org.au/Papers/ABS-CensusPIA-160212.pdf  
44  Ibid. 
45  Ibid. 
21 
 
Australian Privacy Foundation commented:  ‘Apart from any inadequate direct 
notification of the PIA, it seems to have been publicised solely by means of a 
Statement of Intent on the ABS web-site and a media release that received minimal 
coverage: a mention in ‘unashamedly pro-PS’ PS News and one other niche title.’46 
The Australian Privacy Foundation noted: ‘The inadequacy of efforts to publicise the 
PIA process seem to be confirmed by the limited public feedback received, which 
evidently included just three responses from private citizens.’47 
 
Moreover, the Australian Privacy Foundation expressed fundamental substantive 
concerns about the 2016 Census: ‘APF considers that the decision to indefinitely 
retain personal names and addresses fundamentally changes the nature of the 
Australian census, with potentially serious implications for the privacy rights of 
Australians.’ 48  The Australian Privacy Foundation warned: ‘We are especially 
concerned with both the possibility that this additional source of data may act as a 
‘honey pot’ for activities such as identity theft; and with the possibility of ‘function 
creep’, which would result in the expanded use of this data for unintended and 
possibly unwelcome purposes.’ 49  The Australian Privacy Foundation stressed: 
‘Concerns about census information are greater in 2016 due to reports of more 
explicit threats of the use of legal compulsion against citizens who may be less certain 
about participation as a result of the changes in the census (an anonymous, specific 
purpose, temporary and relatively safe one-off snapshot appears to have changed into 
																																																								
46  Ibid. 
47  Ibid. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Ibid. 
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a less-safe, personally identified, lifetime longitudinal dossier, with potentially fewer 
protections)’.50 
 
The former chief Statistician, Bill McLennan, was also shocked and dismayed over 
the approach of 2016 Census to privacy: 
 
Unfortunately, Australian citizens will have no “control over how their personal information is 
handled” in the forthcoming Census of Population and Housing. The ABS is collecting name 
and address of each Australian, will retain that information and will match the Census records 
with various administrative records held by government (health, tax, New Start, social security, 
etc). Australians will be given no say in how their information is used as the ABS has said the 
provision of ‘name and address’ is compulsory. This is a direct and deliberate breach of the 
Australia’s Privacy Principles, which, to say the least, is a surprising action for the ABS to be 
taking.51 
 
Bill McLennan warned: ‘By doing this, the ABS has put the very success and value of 
the 2016 Census at significant risk.’52 He highlighted the lack of consultation by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics with the public, civil society, privacy experts, and 
information security specialists. 
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Former Privacy Commissioner Malcolm Crompton has observed that the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics had made a string of errors during the process. 53  First, he 
commented that the approach of the institution would threaten anonymity and 
privacy: ‘Because it was going to be collecting and retaining the additional 
information, the anonymity of the completed census forms would be gone.’54 Second, 
Crompton observed that such problems were compounded by a lack of transparent 
decision-making by the Australian Bureau of Statistics:  
 
The issues there were pure privacy issues, in that there was a sense that the ABS wasn’t being 
sufficiently transparent about what it was doing. That ABS was doing things on the quiet. 
There was also not enough assurance that anything it said it was doing was what it said it was 
actually doing. That debate had gone on all of this year.55 
 
Third, Crompton chides the Australian Bureau of Statistics for making unrealistic 
claims about security. He commented: ‘The problem was that amidst that privacy 
debate, the ABS was giving unrealistic assurances as to the security of the 
information and that it wouldn’t be hacked.’ 56  Crompton stressed that such an 
assurance was unwarranted: ‘All data is vulnerable, but there are steps you can take to 
reduce the vulnerability and respond to it.’57 
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Journalist Bernard Keane has expressed concerns about the 2016 Census relating to 
anonymity, privacy, and information security – as well worries about the 
administration and governance of the scheme.58 He commented that the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics went ahead with its approach, despite previous objections: 
 
In 2005, some luckless ABS official thought it would be smart to commission an 
independent report on the idea of keeping names to establish unique identifiers for census 
information. Privacy expert Nigel Waters was duly commissioned and duly panned the idea. 
This briefly deterred the Bureau, but in 2011 it decided to start the process of establishing 
ongoing tracking of citizens via a 5% sample from the census that year — without the 
permission or even knowledge of the “participants”, or any independent assessment of the 
selection process. It then decided to extend that to the entire population — but this time the 
ABS made sure there was no risk of it being derailed. Rather than conduct another 
independent assessment, it conducted an internal review that, quelle surprise, determined the 
idea was a good one. On the basis of its own assessment, it waited until a week before 
Christmas last year to sneak out an announcement that it would be retaining names and 
addresses.59 
 
Keane noted that the ‘announcement failed to actually explain the purposes of 
keeping names and addresses, beyond the anodyne assertion that it was “to provide a 
richer and dynamic statistical picture of Australia through the combination of Census 
data with other survey and administrative data.”’ 60  He observed the lack of 
community consultation about the proposal: ‘There was no discussion of how this the 
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names and addresses — which everyone is hung up on –are just a tool to enable the 
establishment of a permanent file on each Australian, composed of our most personal 
details.’61 He concluded: ‘ABS staff have gone too far toward seeing Australians 
simply as a vast data source to be manipulated — by legal compulsion, if necessary 
— for the purposes of bureaucrats, not as legitimate partners and customers with their 
own views about the line to be drawn between claims of the public good and personal 
rights.’62 
 
Libertarian philosopher of the IPA, Chris Berg, raised concerns about the impact of 
the Census 2016 upon freedom, liberty, and privacy.63 He reflected upon the initiative: 
 
It is true that modern governments are data hungry. Planners and regulators want more and 
more information about the populations they govern. But to the extent we have an interest in 
protecting ourselves against government excesses, we have an interest in denying 
governments carte blanche to collect information. We are not just data points in a planner's 
spreadsheet. They work for us.64 
 
Chris Berg observed: ‘The risks to privacy are blindingly obvious.’ 65  He also 
highlighted problems in respect of anonymity, identity theft, information insecurity, 
hacking, and misuse of personal information. Berg noted that ‘Government 
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departments have a poor record of protecting information from their own staff.’66  The 
Australian Bureau of Statistics does not have an unblemished record. Indeed, the 
institution had embroiled in a criminal investigation of insider trading.67 
 
M.I.T. Emeritus Professor Gary Marx's ‘Ethics of Surveillance’ can be usefully 
applied to an analysis of the Australian 2016 Census. 68  He identifies nine key 
questions for the ethics of surveillance. First, there is a need to evaluate policies, 
procedures, and capacities. Second, there should be an evaluation of the means of 
surveillance. Third, there is a focus upon clarity of goals. Fourth, there is a need to 
consider the goodness of the fit between means and goals. Fifth, there should be an 
evaluation of data collection and analysis. Considerations such as criteria for subject 
selection, minimization of intrusiveness, border crossings, and violation of 
assumptions are important in this regard. Sixth, Marx highlights the need to consider 
the harmful consequences and disadvantages for subjects. Seventh, the rights and 
resources of subjects are important. Of particular note are the right of inspection; the 
right to challenge and express a grievance; redress and sanctions; equal access to 
surveillance and neutralization tools. Eighth, Marx discusses consequences for agents 
and third parties. The ninth factor concerns data protection, periodic review, and data 
fate. 
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Applying this multi-factorial test to the 2016 Census, there are a range of problems 
under an ‘Ethics of Surveillance’. Surveillance ethics applies the test of ‘role 
reversal’. It has been notable that, while the Australian Bureau of Statistics has 
demanded that citizens participate in the census, the organisation has not been 
forthcoming about answering questions about its decision-making process for the 
Census 2016. The organisation has been operated in an opaque fashion, while 
simultaneously requiring the collection of personally and identifiable and sensitive 
information about individuals. 
 
Josh Taylor from Crikey News was met with stonewalling and mass redactions in 
respect of his freedom of information requests, as evident in the image copied below: 
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The journalist for The Australian, Sean Parnell, has revealed the rather cursory use of 
focus groups to justify sweeping changes to the approach to the Census 2016, with the 
[superficial] findings shown in the images below.69 
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b.  the scope, collection, retention, security and use of data obtained in the 
2016 Census 
 
Compelling individuals to provide identifiable personal information or be subject to 
fines or prosecution is a major concern as it removes capacity to provide consent (in 
direct conflict with the Australian Privacy Principles, Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)). This 
concern has been the main focus of public attention. The ABS has attempted to offer 
reassurance that personal and sensitive information will be de-identified and replaced 
with a statistical linkage key (SLK) to be indefinitely maintained by the ABS. 
However, use of a SLK does not protect the identity of individuals as data matching 
enables re-identification. That is, the use of a SLK is readily reidentifiable and does 
not offer any privacy protection.70 This is especially noteworthy given the potential 
for data matching across existing and future administrative data and information 
assets, including longitudinal tracking via the SLK. While the collection and retention 
of personally identifiable information is a concern, re-identification, matching and 
longitudinal tracking can occur without the provision of names and addresses. This is 
especially noteworthy as longitudinal matching of data via the SLK or other 
identifiers heightens the activities of the ABS beyond the collection and dissemination 
of statistical information to lifelong surveillance.  
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c. arrangements, including contractual arrangements, in respect of the 
information technology aspects of the Census; 
 
There has been much discussion about the allocation of responsibility for the Census 
Fail in Australia.71 
 
There has been a lively public debate about the extent to which the various parties of 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, IBM, and the Federal Government should be held 
responsible and accountable for the failure of the Census.72 
 
The Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has contemplated legal action 
against IBM, in the wake of the Census debacle.73 
 
Lawyers spoken to by The Australian Financial Review said legal action against IBM 
was a possibility. 74 Roland Müller of Parke Lawyers commented: ‘The census site 
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failing does not necessarily mean IBM's service was valueless and that money has to 
be repaid, but depending on the agreements with IBM and other contractors, there 
may well be liability if they failed to meet their obligations around system security 
and stability.’75 
 
Queenslanders were reminded of the conflict between the Queensland Government 
and IBM over the payroll for Queensland Health. 76  The Premier at the time, 
Campbell Newman said his Government was committed to recovering some of the 
cost: ‘Queenslanders were wronged, we believe, in the pay affair, and we intend to do 
what we can to recover money - for them, the taxpayers, the men and women and 
Queensland.’77 
 
The Supreme Court of Queensland case of IBM Australia Ltd. v State of Queensland 
makes for sobering reading.78 Martin J observed: 
 
The history of attempts to improve the efficiency of government services in Australia is not 
one of consistent outcomes. There have been many successes, some indifferent results and a 
few spectacular fiascos. The attempt that gives rise to this case belongs firmly in the last 
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category. It has emerged from an effort which has been described as taking “a place in the 
front rank of failures in public administration in this country. It may be the worst.”79 
 
In the end, the new Queensland Government decided not to appeal in the matter.80 
Deputy Premier Jackie Trad said: ‘We think it's time to close the chapter and move 
on.’ 81 
 
The former Premier of Queensland, Campbell Newman, lamented that the calamity of 
Census Fail may well have been avoided if the past experience of Queensland had 
been heeded.82 He reflected: 
 
People should lose their jobs over this. As premier, I had to prepare the state of Queensland to 
host the G20 and I took a huge personal interest in cyber security to the point that myself, the 
deputy premier and treasurer conducted our own interviews where we summoned all the 
departments and agencies in for meetings with us to question them intensively about what 
their preparations were for G20 in terms of hacking. We were told we were going to be a 
target for denial of service or hacking attacks during G20. I don’t accept the excuse for the 
census that I’ve seen on TV. I don’t understand, and I don’t accept, why this happened.83 
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Campbell Newman observed that a Google search would have revealed IBM’s poor 
performance at Queensland Health.  He commented: ‘I’ve got to say that very public 
fight was right there in front of the federal officials when they were deciding who to 
contract for the ABS project.’84 
 
It is notable that IBM has reportedly sacked staff, as a result of the conduct of the 
2016 in Australia.85 
 
Subsequently, there has been a similar controversy over an IBM payroll in Canada, 
which echoes census and Queensland Health failures.86  
 
The Census 2016 failure does seem to raise larger questions about information 
technology arrangements, contracting, outsourcing, and the Government’s innovation 
agenda.87 This is aligned with the fiscal environment – especially following the recent 
Commission of Audit in 2013/ 2014. 
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d. the shutting down of the Census website on the evening of 9 August 2016, 
the factors leading to that shutdown and the reasons given, and the support 
provided by government agencies, including the Australian Signals Directorate; 
 
The collection and storage of digital information presents numerous concerns for 
current and future information security. Any previous or future data breaches to the 
ABS website or ABS information holdings should be publicly disclosed and subject 
to formal inquiry. 
 
Public attention in relation to the concern of information security has tended to focus 
on external threats and the potential for ‘hacking,’ particularly following the events of 
the evening of the 9th of August. The potential for internal unauthorised access of 
identifiable, sensitive and personal information should also be considered. This has 
occurred in Australian police and other government agencies.  
 
e.  the response rate to the Census and factors that may have affected the 
response rate 
 
The ABS failed to engage in public consultation about the rationale for the collection 
of personally identifiable information, the extended retention of that information, and 
information security. As a result of privacy and security concerns, there were strong 
calls from civil society organisations and current Senators to boycott the census, 
refuse to provide names or provide false information. It is reasonable to expect that 
the requirement for individuals to provide identifiable information could have 
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impacted both the validity and reliability of information collected. The closure of the 
census website on the 9th of August (as a result of suspected / reported Distributed 
Denial of Service DDoS attacks) contributed to public apprehension in relation to the 
security of personal information provided to the ABS. This has the potential to erode 
public confidence and trust in both the ABS and the Census. These issues also extend 
to the reporting and use of the information collected from the 2016 Census. Serious 
consideration about the integrity of the 2016 Census dataset is required, during 
interpretation and any future use in informing policy decisions. 
 
Furthermore, there needs to be much greater transparency regarding the events of the 
Census night, in which the Australian Census collapsed. There have been many 
competing explanations in respect of the events on Census night from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, the Federal Government, IBM, and other key other players. 
 
f.  privacy concerns in respect of the 2016 Census, including the use of data 
linking, information security and statistical linkage keys 
 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics has lost public trust and confidence over the 
Census 2016. The Census 2016 fails to respect the right to anonymity, even though 
that is one of the basic Privacy Principles in Australia. There are substantive privacy 
risks and information security problems associated with the Australian Census. The 
Australian Bureau of Statistics has withdrawn its claim that its website is in the cyber-
secure zone.88 
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The New South Wales Privacy Commissioner Elizabeth Coombs expressed concerns 
about the multitude of risks over radical plans to store Australians’ names and 
addresses in a government database after the Census. 89  She said: ‘From a risk-
management perspective, it’s hard not to be concerned about the proposed changes.’90 
Coombs observed: ‘There are a range of risks and it’s not just the risk of misuse. The 
Census is a valuable information and data source.’91 
 
The former Deputy New South Wales Privacy Commissioner - Anna Johnston of 
Salinger Privacy - has also been highly critical of the conduct of the 2016 Census. To 
begin with, she expressed concerns about the impact of the 2016 Census on 
anonymity.92 Johnston commented: 
 
This proposal represents the most significant and intrusive collection of identifiable data about 
you, me, and every other Australian, that has ever been attempted. It will allow the ABS to 
build up, over time, a rich and deep picture of every Australian’s life, in an identifiable form. 
 Up until now, the name and address portion of census forms was not retained by the 
ABS; just as soon as the rest of your census answers were transcribed, the paper forms were 
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destroyed.  But the new proposal is to keep name and address, as well as your answers to all 
the Census questions included this year, such as sex, age, marital status, indigenous status, 
religious affiliation, income, education level, ancestry, language spoken at home, occupation, 
work address, previous home address, vehicles garaged at your address, and the relationships 
between people living in the same home.  
 Statements from the ABS which trivialise the risks posed by stripping away census 
anonymity have missed the point. Seeking to justify the proposal by saying that the ABS will 
never release identifiable information ignores the point that they shouldn’t have it in the first 
place. And, as my mother taught me – you shouldn’t make promises you cannot keep.93 
 
Johnston noted: ‘The ABS is not magically immune to the risk of data breaches.’94 
She observed: ‘It was only last year that one of their staff was convicted of leaking 
data to a friend at the NAB as part of a multi-million dollar insider trading scam.’95 As 
a result of her concerns, Johnston reluctantly decided to boycott the 2016 Census.96  
 
Privacy advocates have been concerned by the precedent of the 2016 Census (and 
previous censuses). 97  Amy Gray from Digital Rights Watch complained: ‘The 
Turnbull Government’s handling of the Census to date demonstrates both a total 
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disrespect for personal privacy rights and lack of digital literacy.’98 She observed: 
‘The frustration felt by the public extends far beyond the inconvenience of the website 
crashing on Census night.’ 99  Amy Gray noted: ‘Valid privacy concerns were 
dismissed, confusion and obfuscation about the ‘attacks’ on the ABS servers pervaded 
throughout the media, and very little information was provided to the public about 
what had actually occurred.’ 100  She commented: ‘What is urgently needed is an 
independent investigation of the whole process, including a forensic report of the 
cause of the website crash, the handling of privacy concerns and the outsourcing of 
key services to private companies.’101 
 
The 2016 Australian Census was administered in a way that was in conflict with the 
Australian Privacy Principles, principally the removal of the option of transacting 
anonymously or using a pseudonym. As discussed above, the creation of a SLK 
enabling longitudinal tracking raises a series of privacy concerns given the potential 
for future scope or function creep (where information collected for one purpose is 
used for a range of secondary, tertiary or unknown or unanticipated future purposes). 
This includes the ability to match and connect information, or consolidate 
information, across existing or future administrative data and information assets. This 
provides the potential for the ABS (and/or other agencies) to develop and maintain a 
comprehensive picture of individuals’ lives. This is further compounded by 
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opaqueness about how information will be used, by whom, and for what specific 
purposes.  
 
A number of politicians have expressed privacy concerns about the 2016 Census. 
Senator Nick Xenophon wants the law to be changed so it is not compulsory to 
provide an individual's name.102 He said: ‘I will not be providing my name for this 
year's census.’103 Xenophon observed: ‘I do so in full knowledge that I may face 
prosecution under the Census Statistics Act of 1905, and that currently involves a fine 
of $180 per day that is cumulative for every day of non-compliance.’104 Xenophon 
promised: ‘I will contest any such notice, and by doing so I will in effect turn it into a 
test case.’105 Xenophon commented: 
 
The government should be requesting our consent, rather than requiring our names through 
coercion. Australians expect the rule of law, not ruled by law. This is a battle worth fighting. 
It’s not just just because privacy is an inherent human right to maintain the human condition 
with dignity and respect but also because it seems the ABS, with the support of the Australian 
Government is about to trash that human right. And the way they’ve done so has been 
completely undignified and disrespectful to all of us.106 
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He highlighted the work of Professor Daniel Solove about ‘Why Privacy Matters’.107 
 
Likewise, a number of members of Australian Greens have expressed privacy 
concerns about the 2016 Census. Senator Scott Ludlam has been deeply concerned 
about the 2016 Census.108 He observed: ‘While parliament was in recess, a process 
that most Australians would normally find largely uncontroversial blew up 
spectacularly in the government's face, severely damaging confidence in the 
Commonwealth's lead statistical agency, potentially placing at risk the privacy of 
millions of people and likely compromising one of the most important datasets used 
daily by policymakers and researchers around the country.’ 109 Senator Scott Ludlam 
particularly objected to the creation of a Statistical Linkage Key: 
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The creation of such a unified identifier for every single Australian—not opt in, not opt out, 
but mandatory—should have been subject to a substantial public debate and a measured 
weighing of the costs and benefits. Such a debate will inevitably take place in the context of 
high-profile data breaches here and around the world, indiscriminate surveillance and data 
storage by signals intelligence agencies, and the potential misuse of such data either by 
authorised agencies or by unauthorised actors. This is a conversation that needs to be had. I 
am not sure that this is necessarily a Left or a Right thing either. This is something the Greens 
have advocated strongly from, but I would have thought the libertarian wing of the Liberal 
Party—or actual libertarians like Senator Leyonhjelm—would have some views on something 
like this. I do not think there is a clean Left or Right political divide here; this is a debate that 
absolutely needs to be had by the light of day.110 
 
Ludlam lamented: ‘In contemptuously dismissing those concerns, the government 
guaranteed that the census data would, at bare minimum, be compromised, and, as we 
found out on census night, it was actually a lot worse than that.’111 Senator Scott 
Ludlam commented: ‘Census fail was clearly avoidable, but the best thing that can 
come out of this debacle is a measured and thoughtful debate on data sovereignty, the 
role of the census in setting policy, the place of big data in our society and what 
happens when governments try to cut corners on census night.’112 
 
Greens Senator Sarah Hanson-Young also said: ‘I will complete the census, because 
the data is important for helping us as a nation to understand who we are, but I won't 
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include my name.’ 113  Greens Senator Janet Rice has also expressed her privacy 
concerns about the 2016 Census. 
 
Jacqui Lambie has also expressed concerns about the privacy implications of the 2016 
Census.114 
 
In the House of Representatives, the Independent Member for Denison, Andrew 
Wilkie MP, has expressed his concerns about the 2016 Census. 115  He observed: 
‘Despite the collection of names in previous censuses the logic for this has not been 
communicated to the public, if indeed there is any logic at all.’116 Moreover, he noted: 
‘Nor has any explanation been given for why the ABS holding this information for 
much longer than normal is warranted.’117 
 
Rather pithily, Peter Garrett – former Australian Labor Party minister and campaigner 
against the Australian Card – commented: ‘We should not consent to data linkage 
through a single identifier #census 2016 [same problems] as the ID card, function 
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creep & state scrutiny.’118 His recent autobiography Big Blue Sky devoted a whole 
chapter on the battles over the Australia Card.119 
 
The legal and political challenge to the Australian Bureau of Statistics on privacy 
grounds by Senators Nick Xenophon, Sarah Hanson-Young, Scott Ludlam, Janet Rice 
and Jacqui Lambie is to be welcomed. Such politicians have shown real leadership in 
defending the privacy, freedom, and civil liberties of Australian citizens. 
 
In addition to questions about anonymity, privacy, and information security, there 
were also deep concerns about the research ethics of the Census Fail. Ethical research 
involves confidentiality, informed consent, voluntary participation, and compulsion or 
fines or threat thereof. Unfortunately, the approach taken by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics fails to respect these established ethical standards. There is a need to respect 
the rights and liberties of research participants – especially those in high-risk and 
vulnerable communities. 
 
Dr Leslie Cannold – an academic specialist in research ethics – lamented that the 
Census did not meet best policies or practices.120 She commented: 
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Research ethics matter and are relevant to all data collection projects, including the Census. 
Critical questions of informed consent and confidentiality were swept aside in Census 2016. 
This has had predictably disastrous consequences for public trust and the reliability of the data 
collected. The upside of #Censusfail is that it’s provided Australian leaders with a chance to 
consult with experts and the Australian people about the consent and privacy implications of 
Big Data. This is the research ethics, digital privacy and personal information debate we had 
to have.121 
 
Cannold called on the government ‘to adopt best practice ethical and governance 
standards in the collection, use, linkage and storage of Australians’ personal and 
sensitive data.’122 
 
It should be noted that there has been significant litigation in the past over research, in 
which there has been a lack of prior, informed consent.123 
 
The failure of the Census is not an isolated problem. The Hon. Michael Kirby has 
lamented that the Federal Parliament has failed to act on privacy protection over the 
last forty years.124 In an age of Big Data, Cloud Computing, and Hacking, there is an 
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even greater need for privacy protection in Australia.125 The work of Professor Ron 
Deibert and the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto has highlighted the 
increasing threats posed by surveillance.126 
 
We need a statutory cause of action for serious invasions of privacy, as recommended 
by the Australian Law Reform Commission.127 We need mandatory disclosure of data 
breaches. We need to update our privacy laws and strengthen transparency, 
accountability and oversight as a matter of urgency.  
 
g.  Australia’s Census of Population and Housing generally, including 
purpose, scope, regularity and costs and benefits 
 
The Census is recognised as playing an important part in informing public policy, 
service delivery and research. However, for the reasons outline above, the validity and 
reliability of the information collected in the 2016 Census should be subject to 
rigorous critique prior to use in informing any future policy decisions. 
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It is also noted that through techniques of random stratified sampling, it would be 
possible to collect information that is generalisable to the Australian population with a 
high degree of statistical confidence. Certainly, this is the empirical method adopted 
in most quantitative social science research. This option would represent a more cost 
effective alternative to a census, or re-administration of the 2016 census, and would 
not require the collection or retention of sensitive personal information from every 
Australian citizen or resident. The Australian Bureau of Statistics should consider 
adopting stratified sampling techniques to supplement / replace the collection of 
extensive sensitive personal information from every Australian citizen or resident. 
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h. the adequacy of funding and resources to the ABS; 
 
The 2016 Census failure raises larger questions about the adequacy of funding and 
resources to the Australian Bureau of Statistics. There are larger issues raised in 
respect of the Audit Commission report and the general fiscal environment within 
government, efficiency dividends, requiring increased outsourcing and contracting 
and the issues this presents in terms of accountability. 
 
i.  ministerial oversight and accountability 
 
Clearly, there have been problems with the governance, transparency, and 
accountability of the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Peter Martin, the economics 
editor for the Sydney Morning Herald and The Age, has been insightful about the 
governance problems afflicting the institution. 128  He observed that the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics had embarked upon grandiose plans, while suffering from 
budgetary stagnation: 
 
The Bureau's newly installed chief, David Kalisch, was war-gaming an even grander solution. 
Dubbed "Project Archer" after Keith Archer, the Australian Statistician who introduced 
computers to the ABS in the 1960s, it would make the 2016 census go away, freeing up $200 
million to $400 million to upgrade the Bureau's aging computer systems, some of which ran 
code that was 30 years old. His predecessor Brian Pink had left at the start of 2014, warning in 
his final annual report that the Bureau had barely enough cash to "keep the lights on". When 
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Pink arrived in 2007 the Bureau received $302 million in a non-census year. Seven years of 
growing expenses and relentless "efficiency dividends" later, it received scarcely any more, 
$312 million.129 
 
His analysis reveals a public institution in crisis – with significant issues in respect of 
leadership, accountability, and transparency. There have been significant difficulties 
in obtaining access under freedom of information laws to key internal documents 
related to the policy-making of the Australian Bureau of Statistics.130 There has a 
massive loss of public trust in the Australian Bureau of Statistics in the wake of the 
controversy.131 
 
Moreover, there has been inadequate Ministerial and government oversight of the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. Peter Martin, the economics editor for the Sydney 
Morning Herald and The Age, highlighted the lack of government oversight of the 
Census 2016.132 He observed that the chaos of Census 2016 was accentuated by the 
shifting ministerial responsibilities in the portfolio: 
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The new minister, Michael McCormack, in the job for mere weeks, at first couldn't get 
through to Kalisch. McCormack had been appointed after an embarrassing interlude in which 
there seemed to be no minister responsible. Hawke's position had been abolished and neither 
treasurer Scott Morrison nor financial services minister Kelly O'Dwyer had been given the 
job. A fortnight after being appointed small business minister McCormack was told it was his. 
 
Clearly, there needs to better Ministerial and government oversight of the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics – instead of a laissez-faire approach to the public institution’s 
management of the Census. 
 
By the same token, it was disappointing that the opposition party – the Australian 
Labor Party – did not engage with the deeper legal, ethical, and public policy issues 
underlying the Census Fail. Andrew Leigh MP, for instance, argued: ‘If the 
Government can’t run a Census, how can they govern a country?’133 However, beyond 
this party political attack, there was a lack of a deeper analysis of the issue by the 
Australian Labor Party. While noting complaints from constituents, the Australian 
Labor Party urged Australians to complete the survey. There was a failure to grapple 
with the larger problems in respect of anonymity, confidentiality, privacy, research 
ethics, and compulsion. It seems a problematic position of the Australian Labor Party 
to urge completion of the census, without resolving legal, ethical, and public policy 
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concerns associated with the Census 2016.134 Moreover, it is disappointing that the 
Australian Labor Party has supported the imposition of fines for the non-completion 
of the Census, notwithstanding the issues discussed above.135 
 
In addition to ministerial oversight and accountability there should be further 
independent and sufficiently resourced oversight, for example, by the Australian 
Office of Information Commissioner. This office should have been actively involved 
in conducting an independent Privacy Impact Assessment (rather than the PIA being 
conducted internally by the ABS itself).  The Office of Australian Information 
Commissioner should be playing a more active and independent role but too has been 
subject to budgetary cuts and issues of impartiality from government. 
 
j.  any related matters 
 
The digitalisation of the Census, extended retention of information and compulsion to 
provide identifiable information is occurring in conjunction with a broader range of 
information collection initiatives by government. Examples include: mandatory 
metadata retention; the National Facial Biometrics Matching Capability; 
centralisation of police information systems and biometric information via CrimTrac 
(now Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission); MyGov; My Health Record, and 
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the Trusted Digital Identity Framework currently being introduced by the Digital 
Transformation Office. Therefore, the privacy and security issues raised by the 2016 
Census as outlined above should be considered within this context, especially due to 
the ability to integrate and match information across systems.  
 
The expansion in the nature and volume of information collected by government, and 
complete disregard for the Australian Privacy Principles, means that privacy 
protections in Australia are at risk of becoming obsolete. 
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3. The Canadian Debate over Census 2016 
 
 
Statistics Canada celebrates Census 2016 on social media 
 
In contrast to Australia’s Census Fail, Statistics Canada has celebrated its recent 
census as the ‘Best Census since 1666.’136 Statistics Canada that 98.4 per cent of the 
population filled out their long-and-short form questionnaires. Navdeep Bains, a new 
Minister for the Trudeau Government, commented upon the success of the Census: 
 
Canadians can be proud of their participation in the 2016 Census. Their outstanding support 
has enabled Statistics Canada to carry out the most successful census in Canadian history.137 
 
It is worthwhile investigating the Census 2016 in Canada as a counterpoint and a 
contrast to Australia’s 2016 Census. 
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While initially the experience of Statistics Canada appears positive, upon closer 
inspection a number of controversies with the Canadian census become apparent.  
Like Australia, the website for Statistics Canada became unavailable. While Statistics 
Canada blamed the high traffic, the internal documents obtained by the CBC revealed 
that design flaws were responsible.138 Dean Beeby reported: 
 
In fact, traffic on the website was only at about 50 per cent of expected capacity, according to 
documents obtained by CBC News under the Access to Information Act. The trouble began at 
6:59 p.m. ET on May 2, when the website experienced congestion for 35 minutes, preventing 
some from filing their data. The documents blame the digital traffic jam on the large size of 
Statistics Canada's so-called "landing page," the first page users see when signing on. The 
page design used a lot of bandwidth, and clogged the system as it was being downloaded to 
thousands of home computers.139 
 
While there are similarities to the situation in Australia, an important difference has 
been that it has been difficult to gain access to the ABS’ internal documents (or legal 
advice) in relation to the 2016 Census. 
 
There have also been controversies in relation to the Canadian census over 
compulsion, mandatory participation and fines. For example, in 2011, Audrey Tobias, 
an 89-year-old woman who also refused to fill out the 2011 census, was brought to 
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court. 140   A peace activist, she declined to participate in the Census because of 
concerns about the involvement of Lockheed Martin. Audrey Tobias's lawyer, Peter 
Rosenthal, had argued that forcing her to complete the census would violate her 
freedom of conscience and freedom of expression under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. While the judge dismissed the Charter arguments, he said that 
there was reasonable doubt as to Audrey Tobias’ intent at the time of the refusal, 
given her memory and conflicting testimony. The Toronto judge Ramez Khaly found 
that she was not guilty, and soundly criticized the government for trying to prosecute 
someone who was a ‘model citizen.’141  The judge said the decision to prosecute 
Tobias, a Second World War veteran, was a ‘PR disaster.’ The lawyer Peter 
Rosenthal reflected upon the ruling: ‘He described our charter arguments as Hail 
Mary passes and he didn't catch it ...They were novel arguments but he found a more 
novel argument it seems in analyzing the [intent].’142 
 
In the 2013 case of R v. Finley, the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan considered 
another matter of fines in respect of the census.143 Sandra Finley refused to complete 
the census, saying Statistics Canada required information from a biographical core of 
personal information that she wanted to keep private.  She believed the request to 
complete the Long Form Census violated her ‘right to privacy’ under s. 8 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  The trial judge dismissed the application 
																																																								
140  CBC News, ‘Census Protester Audrey Tobias Acquitted of not Filing Form’, CBC News, 9 
October 2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/census-protester-audrey-tobias-acquitted-of-
not-filing-form-1.1930998  
141  Ibid. 
142  Ibid. 
143  R v Finley 2013 SKCA 47 http://canlii.ca/t/fxctz  
58 
 
by Finley. The Court of Queen’s Bench dismissed her appeal. The Court of Appeal 
for Saskatchewan also rejected a further appeal: 
 
Unless a court is satisfied that the state has intruded upon an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the individual will not be able to assert successfully that there has been 
a search let alone an unreasonable search or seizure.   The summary conviction appeal court 
judge might have expressed this principle more clearly, but I have no doubt what he meant is 
that s. 8 does not protect all privacy interests, but reasonable expectations of privacy only.  
With regulatory statutes, like the Statistics Act, a person’s reasonable expectations of privacy 
are considered to be lower than in other contexts. This does not mean a court is not required to 
undertake the close analysis that the trial judge did in this case, but it does mean that once the 
analysis is complete, the result may very well be that the person cannot claim the state action 
in question constituted a search for the purposes of raising a s. 8 Charter challenge.144 
 
This case seems to be a striking contrast to the outcome in respect of Audrey Tobias. 
The outcomes of the legal cases in Canada over the refusal to complete the Census 
seem very dependent upon individual judicial decision-making, and hard to reconcile 
with one another. 
 
In 2014, a 79-year-old Toronto woman, Janet Churnin, was prosecuted over 
contravening the Statistics Act through refusal to complete the mandatory census.145 
She argued that the compulsion to do the Census was a violation of Churnin’s Charter 
rights of freedom of expression and conscience, as well as an unreasonable search and 
seizure. Justice Cathy Mocha dismissed the defence’s arguments. She observed: ‘Miss 
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Churnin deliberately refused to fill out the census.’146 Mocha commented: ‘It was 
committed deliberately, but I agree with your counsel that you did this on moral 
grounds.’147 The judge took into account Conservative MP Tony Clement’s comments 
that refusing to fill out the census should not be met with a threat of jail time. Defence 
lawyer Peter Rosenthal asked for an absolute discharge, but the judge disagreed, 
saying: ‘It is general deterrence to stop others from doing this.’148 Janet Churnin was 
sentenced to 50 hours of community service. 
 
The messy litigation in respect of the Canadian Census underlines the problematic 
nature of collecting government information, with mandatory participation, 
compulsion, threats, and fines. 
 
It should also be noted that Australia does not enjoy the same sort of constitutional 
protection for human rights, civil liberties, and individual freedoms such as privacy – 
as Canada does with the protection afforded by the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.   
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